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Abstract
While  existing literature  has examined the impact of  investors  in technology-intensive  sectors that rely heavily
intellectual  property protection on the volume  of foreign  on intellectual  property rights. The results also  indicate
direct investment  (FDI), little is known about its effect  that a weak intellectual  property  regime encourages
on the composition  of FDI inflows.  Smarzynska  investors to undertake projects  focusing  on distribution
addresses this question  empirically,  using a unique firm-  rather than local production.  The latter effect is present
level data set from Eastern Europe and the former  Soviet  in all sectors,  not just those relying  heavily on intellectual
Union. She finds that weak protection  deters foreign  property  protection.
This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to examine the effects
of intellectual property protection on economic activity. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,  1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Flewitt, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-2724,  fax 202-
522-1159, email address  pflewittCaworldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:/
/econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be  contacted  at bsmarzynska(a@worldbank.org.  February 2002.  (26 pages)
The Policy Research  *  .. - Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
developmient issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly,  even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The j  d. ..  interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Protection of intellectual  property  rights (IPRs) has been a prominent  item on international policy
agenda.  Despite  the  introduction  of the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of Intellectual  Property
Rights  (TRIPs),  many  developing  economies  are  not  eager  to  strengthen  their  IPR  legislation  and  its
enforcement  fearing  that  the  losses  resulting  from  this  action  would  outweigh  its  benefits.  This  paper
contributes  to  a  better  understanding  of  potential  gains  from  stronger  IPR  protection  by  providing
empirical evidence  indicating that the extent of IPR protection  in a host country affects the composition of
foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  it  receives.  More  specifically,  this study finds  that a  weak  IPR  regime
deters  foreign  investment in high technology  sectors where  intellectual  property rights play an  important
role. Moreover,  it tilts the focus of FDI projects  from manufacturing  to distribution.
The  relationship  between  IPR protection  and FDI is quite complex.  On the one hand,  a weak  IPR
regime  increases  the probability  of imitation,  which  makes  a host  country  a  less  attractive  location  for
foreign  investors.  On  the  other  hand,  strong  protection  may  shift  the  preference  of  multinational
corporations  from  FDI towards  licensing.  As  surveys  of multinationals  have  shown,  the importance  of
IPR protection  varies between  industries.  The concern  about the IPR regime  also depends on the purpose
of an  investment  project,  being  the  highest  in  the  case  of R&D  facilities  and  the  lowest  for projects
focusing  exclusively  on sales and distribution (see Mansfield,  1994 and  1995).
This paper investigates  two hypotheses  that emerge  from the above studies.  First, it tests whether
foreign  investors  in  IPR  sensitive  sectors  (as  indicated  by  Mansfield,  1995)  are  more  affected  by the
extent of intellectual property  protection in a host country than  investors in general.  Second, it examines if
the  IPR  regime  influences  a  foreign  investor's  choice  between  setting  up  production  facilities  and
engaging in activities  focused solely on distribution.
A  unique  firm-level  data  set used  in this study  allows  for  a  more in  depth  examination  of this
phenomenon  than was  possible  in the  earlier literature  which  concentrated  mostly on  aggregate  inflows
and  case  studies.  The  data  set  was  compiled from  a  worldwide  survey of companies  conducted  by the
European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development  (EBRD) in  1995. The survey recipients  were asked
whether  they  had  undertaken  FDI  in  twenty-four  economies  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet
Union  and  if so,  what type  of projects they  were engaged  in.  These responses  were  supplemented  with
information on firm characteristics  and host country specific variables.
This  study  employs  two  measures  of IPR  protection.  The  first  one  is  the  index  capturing  the
strength  of patent  rights  developed  by Ginarte  and  Park  (1997)  and  extended  by the  author to  include
more  transition  economies.  While  the  Ginarte-Park  measure  is  quite  detailed,  it focuses  only  on  laws
present  in the books  but not their enforcement.  Therefore  a second  index,  developed  specifically  for thisstudy, more crude  in nature but taking into account all IPR laws on the books as well  as their enforcement
is also used.
The  empirical  analysis  confirms  the  hypotheses  thus  indicating  that  weak  protection  of
intellectual  property  rights  has a significant  impact on  the composition  of FDI  inflows.  First,  it deters
foreign  investors  in  four  technology-intensive  sectors:  drugs,  cosmetics  and  health  care  products;
chemicals; machinery  and equipment;  and electrical equipment.  These are the sectors in which, according
to  survey  studies,  IPRs  play  a particularly  prominent  role.  Second, weak  protection  encourages  foreign
investors to set up distribution facilities  rather than to engage in local production.  Interestingly, this effect
is significant  in the case of all  investors, not just those  in sensitive  industries.  Finally, the results suggest
that investors  respond to both laws on the books and their enforcement.  The above  findings are robust to
controls for privatization,  transition progress, corruption  level and effectiveness of the legal system.
In  addition to an intrinsic  interest  in transition,  a focus on Eastern Europe  and the former Soviet
Union  can offer insights into the broader question of the role of FDI in economic  development throughout
the world.  While investment in other developing regions has been studied extensively,  one finding of that
research  has  been  the  importance  of previous  investment  experience  as  a  determinant  of current  FDI
flows (see Hallward-Driemeier,  1996). Thus, the impact of current policy variables may be obscured and
overcome  by a long history of past policies, for which it is difficult to control. Transition  economies  offer
almost a natural control since FDI  in the region was negligible prior to 1989. Therefore, the results of this
paper suggest that the importance  of IPR protection  in developing countries may have been understated  in
past research.
This  study  is  structured  as  follows.  The  next  section  briefly  reviews  the  related  literature  and
formulates  the hypotheses  to be  tested. Section  III describes the econometric  specifications  and the  data
set. In Section IV, empirical  results are presented.  Section V concludes the study.
II. RELATED  LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES  TO BE TESTED
The connection  between technological  capabilities of a firm and its decision to undertake  FDI is
highlighted  in Dunning's (1993)  OLI paradigm,  which explains activities  of multinational corporations in
terms  of ownership  (0),  localization  (L)  and  internalization  advantages  (I).'  When  selling  its  products
abroad,  a  firm  is  at  least  initially disadvantaged  relative  to  local  producers.  Thus,  in order  to  compete
effectively with  indigenous firms,  a foreign producer must possess some ownership advantages. They can
take  the  form  of a  superior  production  technology  or  improved  organizational  and  marketing  systems,
innovatory capacity, trademarks, reputation,  or other assets.  Ownership  advantages  assure a firm's ability
'Other  theories of FDI can be found in the surveys of Dunning (1993),  Caves (1996)  and Markusen (1995).
2to  enter the host  country's  market,  but do  not explain  why the  foreign presence  should  be  established
through  production  rather  than exports.  This  issue  is,  in turn,  addressed  by localization advantages that
arise  due  to  differences  in  factor  quality,  costs  and  endowments,  international  transport  and
communication  costs,  overcoming  trade  restrictions,  and  host government  policies.  The  last  advantage,
internalization, explains  why  a  foreign  firrn  prefers  to  retain  full  control  over  the  production  process
instead  of  licensing  its  intangible  assets  to  local  firms.  This  decision  may  be  attributable  to  high
transaction costs  involved in regulating and enforcing  licensing contracts.
Weak  IPR  protection  increases  the  probability  of  imitation,  which  erodes  a  firm's  ownership
advantages  and decreases  localization advantages of a host country.  At the  same time, a weak IPR system
increases  the  benefits  of  internalization,  since  it  is  associated  with  a  greater  risk  of the  licensee's
breaching  the  contract  and  acting  in  direct  competition  with  the  seller.  An  inadequate  IPR  regime,
therefore, deters FDI and encourages  exporting.  A strong IPR system may also have a negative impact  on
FDI by  making licensing a viable alternative to direct investment.2 Thus, the  overall relationship  between
the level of IPR protection and FDI is ambiguous.
The  results  of empirical  studies  exploring  the  impact  of IPR  protection  on  FDI  lead  to  mixed
conclusions.  Ferrantino  (1993)  finds  no  statistically  significant relationship  between  the  extent of U.S.
affiliate  sales in  a  foreign country and that country's  membership  in  an  international  patent or copyright
convention.  Similarly,  Maskus  and Konan (1994)  who employ the Rapp and Rozek  (1990)  index of IPR
protection  as well as Primo Braga and Fink (2000)  who use Ginarte  and Park (1997)  index do not obtain
statistically  significant  results.  Lee  and Mansfield  (1996),  on the other  hand, show  that the strength  of a
country's  IPR  protection,  as  perceived  by  100  U.S.  firms  surveyed,  is  positively  correlated  with  the
volume of U.S.  FDI inflows  into that country.  Smith (2001)  also finds a positive correlation  between  sales
of U.S.  affiliates  and the  strength of IPR  protection  in  a  host country.  None  of these  studies,  however,
looks at the impact of the IPR regime on the composition  of FDI inflows.
Intellectual  property  rights  do  not  play  an  equally  important  role  in  all  sectors  or  even  in  all
technology-intensive  industries. For instance, Mansfield (1995)  mentions that IPR protection may be less
crucial  in  sectors  such  as  automobile  production,  in  which  firms  frequently  cannot  make  use  of a
competitor's technology  without many complex and expensive  inputs.  On the other hand, the IPR regime
is  likely  to  be  important  for  sectors  such  as  drugs,  cosmetics  and  health  care  products;  chemicals;
machinery and equipment;  and electrical equipment.3
2  Indeed  Yang  and  Maskus  (2000)  find  that  licensing  is  more  likely  to  take  place  in  countries  with strong  IPR
protection. Oxley (1999)  also shows that U.S.  companies tend  to choose contract-based  alliances  rather than  equity
joint ventures when they partner with firms  in based in countries with strong intellectual property protection.
3  Baldwin (  1996) also confirms that these sectors rely heavily on IPR protection.
3Additionally,  a survey of U.S.  manufacturing  firms conducted  by Mansfield (1994) revealed that
the importance of IPR regimes for investment decision  depends on the purpose of the investment  project.
For instance,  in the  case of investment  in sales and distribution  outlets,  only about  20 percent of survey
respondents  were  concerned  with  IPR  protection.  In  the  case of investment  in  rudimentary  production
(i.e.,  involving  basic  technologies)  and  assembly  facilities,  30  percent  of  respondents  viewed  IPR
protection  as important. This  percentage increased  to 50-60 for investments  in manufacturing  components
and complete products and to 80 when R&D facilities were involved.
Case  studies  from transition  economies echo the concerns  of foreign investors  about  weak IPR
protection  and  are  consistent  with  the  survey  findings.  For  instance,  Sharp  and  Barz  (1997,  p.  110)
mention  that  ICI  (company  producing  synthetic  organic  chemicals)  and  Zeneca,  a  pharmaceutical
company,  "are  wary of piracy  and  doubtful  about  transferring  either product  or  process  know-how  to
these countries  (i.e.,  transition  economies].  Both companies,  however,  recognize that eventually  Central
and Eastern Europe and the FSU [former Soviet Union] will be important markets.  That is why Zeneca is
investing  in developing  its  distribution  links  in  high  value-added  areas  such  as  medical  supplies  and
equipment and healthcare systems."  Similar picture emerges  from the case study of Shell:
"Shell provides know-how to its Russian partners where necessary,  but does not pass on
anything  it regards  as commercially  sensitive.  A  relevant  example  is Shell's  contract
with the Russian  R&D Institute for Element-Organic  Compounds (INEOS) to produce a
new construction  plastic,  called Noril.  Shell  will supply the chemical  intermediates  for
production,  while  the technology  will be Russian.  There  is no question  of the Russians
either supplying the intermediates or obtaining access to the more up-to-date  technology
used  by General  Electric for the manufacture  of Noril  in the United  States" (Sharp  and
Barz,  1997, pp. 107-108).
Such examples are  obviously not restricted  to Eastern Europe and the  former Soviet Union.  Lan
and Young,  (1996,  p. 73, footnote  9) present a case from China:  "Local staff working  in the laboratories
of two  foreign  affiliates  manufacturing  detergents  discovered  the  contents of production  by repeatedly
trying the combinations.  They then  moved out to set up their  own firms.  In  only a few years, more  than
ten small  local firms were manufacturing detergent." 4
In the light of the theoretical prediction presented above as well as the conclusions emerging from
interviews  with foreign  investors,  the  following  testable  hypotheses  emerge.  (1)  FDI in  sectors relying
heavily on protection of intellectual  property is likely to be deterred by a weak IPR regime. It is not clear,
however,  that this should  be true for FDI  inflows  in  general.  (2)  In  countries  with weak  protection  of
4  Several  Western  law  firms  active in Eastern  Europe (contacted  by  the author)  confirmed  that  their clients,  who
were potential  or actual  foreign investors,  expressed concerns  about weak IPR protection in the region. Two  firms
represented  foreign clients in  patent infringement cases in  transition economies.
4intellectual  property,  investors may be more inclined  to engage  solely in distribution activities  rather than
in local production.  These two hypotheses are tested in this study.
III. ECONOMETRIC  SPECIFICATION AND DATA
Econometric specification
To  test  the  first  hypothesis,  a  probit  model  of  the  determinants  of  investment  decision  is
estimated. The model is of the following form:
FDIiC = I if FDI*  > 0 ic  ~~~ic
FDIiC = 0 otherwise
where
FDI'c = di + Xc fl  + dj  X0/2 + uic
The dependent variable takes on the value of one if firm i has  invested  in country c, and zero if a
firm  has not undertaken  FDI  in country  c.  Thus for each  firm the number of observations  is equal  to the
number  of possible destination  countries  in the  sample.  To  control  for unobserved  firm  characteristics,
firm specific dummy variables di are included.  Additionally,  country specific  explanatory variables X, are
included  in  the model.  Since  the  impact  of IPR  protection  and possibly  other variables  is  expected  to
differ  between  sectors,  the model  allows  for a  separate  coefficient  for high technology  sectors  in  which
IPRs play a more prominent role. It is achieved by interacting X.  with a dummy variable  for these sectors.
Following  the  survey findings  of Mansfield  (1995),  the IPR  sensitive  sectors  include:  drugs,  cosmetics
and health  care  products; chemicals;  machinery  and equipment;  and electrical  equipment.  The errors  are
corrected for a correlation between observations for the same destination  country.
One way of testing the second  hypothesis would be to estimate  a probit model with the dependent
variable  representing  the  choice  between  manufacturing  projects  and  those  focusing  solely  on
distribution.  This, however, would imply that the decision to invest and the decision about the type of the
investment  project  are  taken  separately,  which  may  not  be  the  case.  To  overcome  this  limitation,  we
estimate a system consisting of two parts:  (i) decision whether or not to invest, and (ii) decision regarding
the  purpose  of the  investment  project,  conditional  on  investment  taking  place.  To  learn  more  about
investor  characteristics  that  influence  investors'  choices,  we  use  firm  specific  variables  rather  firm
dummies  in the regressions.  Note that anyway  it would not be possible to employ firm fixed effects  in the
second part of the model  as firms engaged  in a single project or multiple  projects of the same type would
have to be dropped from the estimation.
5As mentioned, the first part  of the  model describes  the  investor's decision  to enter a particular
host country c. As in the estimation above, we allow for a different impact of host country characteristics
on firms in IPR-sensitive  sectors.
FDI iC=1i  D  C> ° F ic~  I1if FDI  ic
FDIic = 0 otherwise
where
FDI c  =X  i+  + XC6 3
3 dHTXC 34 +  ic
The  second  part  describes  the  choice  between  setting  up  production  facilities  in  country  c
(possibly  accompanied  by  distribution  networks)  and  engaging  in  a  project  focusing  solely  on
distribution,  conditional  on  FDI  taking  place.  The  dependent  variable  equals  one  in  the  case  of
manufacturing  FDI.  On the  right  hand  side, both  firm  (X,)  and  host country  (Xc)  specific  variables  are
included.  The  model  allows  for a  different  impact  of the  intellectual  property  regime  on  IPR sensitive
sectors.
MANUFACTURING  = I if MANUFACTURING'  > 0 and FDI.  > 0
MANUFACTURINGIC  =  0 if MANUFACTURING:  s0 and FDI  . > 0 ic  ~~  ~  ~~~~~ic  I
where
MA1ANUFACTURING'  = X  8 + Xcfl + zdlPRc + vic
Assuming that (s,  v) are  i.i.d normal variables with zero means and a correlation coefficient of p,
we  estimate these equations  (probit with sample selection)  simultaneously  by maximum  likelihood.  The
errors are corrected  for a correlation  between  observations  for the same destination country.  The number
of observations  in the FDI decision  equation  is equal  to the number of firms in the sample, multiplied by
the  number  of  destination  countries  in  the  sample.  In  the  second  decision  equation,  the  number  of
observations  is equal to the total number of FDI projects  in the sample. The latter number is smaller than
the former because not all firms invest in all countries.
Data
The  empirical  analysis  employs  a  unique  firm-level  data  set  based  on  the  EBRD  Foreign
Investment Survey. In January  1995,  a brief questionnaire was sent to all companies  listed  in Worldscope
(about 9,500 firms).  Worldscope is a commercial  database that provides detailed financial  statements and
business  descriptions  for  about  ten  thousand  public  companies  located  in  more  than  fifty  countries.
Sending the questionnaire  to all  of them assured that all major public companies  in the world would be
6included.  Responses were obtained  from  1,405  firms that answered  questions regarding  their undertaken
and planned investments  in Eastern Europe  and the former Soviet Union. Additionally, information  on the
function of the  projects  (manufacturing,  distribution,  representative  office)  was collected.5 The  data  set
does  not include any information  on the time when each investment  was undertaken.  Since the magnitude
of FDI inflows was marginal  before  1989,  the information  collected  pertains  mostly to the period  1989-
94.6  Since  the objective  of this study  is to  explore the impact  of government  policies  on the magnitude
and nature of FDI inflows, firms  in the oil, gas  and coal sector, which are  likely to be attracted to natural
resource  endowments, are excluded from the estimations.
Measures of IPR  protection
The  key variable  in the  regression  is a  proxy  for the IPR  regime.  The  indices  of patent  rights
protection developed  by Rapp  and  Rozek (1990)  and Ginarte  and Park  (1997)  are the two  most popular
measures employed  in the  literature.  The  former  index, while  widely used,  is inadequate  for the  purpose
of this paper since it covers  only five countries  from the data set and pertains to the pre-transition  period.
The Ginarte-Park  measure,  on  the other hand,  covers  ten transition  economies  and includes  information
for 1995.7  In order to test the  hypotheses  using the full data  set, the Ginarte-Park  index was extended to
cover nine more countries.8
The Ginarte-Park  index takes  into account  five categories  of patent laws:  (I) extent of coverage,
(2)  membership  in intemational  patent agreements,  (3) provisions for  loss of protection,  (4) enforcement
mechanisms,  and (5)  duration of protection.  Each of the categories  is assigned  a value  between  0 and  1,
and the unweighted  sum of these values constitutes the patent rights index (see Ginarte and Park,  1997 for
a  detailed  description).  Thus,  the  index  ranges  from  zero  to  five  with  the  higher  values  indicating  a
stronger  level  of protection.  The  index  refers  to  1995  or the  closest year for  which the  information  was
5  117  of the  survey respondents  were  chosen  for in-depth  interviews  whose  results  are  discussed  in  Lankes  and
Venables  (1996).
6  CEECs  and  the  FSU  were  virtually  closed  to  foreign  investment  before  1989  (see  Meyer,  1995;  Dunning  and
Rojec,  1993; Hunya,  1997). The figures presented  in the table below reflect this situation.
No. of Joint Ventures  on Jan 1,  1989







Source:  Dunning (1991)
7 The author would like to thank Walter Park for kindly sharing the updated version of the index.
7available. Table  I lists the index values.  The highest score  in the group of countries under consideration
was  obtained  by  Hungary  (3.75),  while  the  lowest  score  of 2.52  belongs  to  Uzbekistan  and  former
Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia.  The  average  value  of the  index  is  3.04.  For comparison,  the  mean
value of the index  for  110  countries  rated in  1995  was 2.67.  A positive coefficient  on the  Ginarte-Park
index  will  indicate  that  stronger  patent  laws  are  associated  with  a  greater  probability  of FDI  being
undertaken.  The advantages  of the Ginarte-Park  index are a great level of detail and taking into account
the treatment of foreigners.  Its main  disadvantage  is the  fact that  it focuses  on the  laws  present on the
books but it does not capture their enforcement.
Since  the  issue of enforcement  may  have  a crucial  impact  on  foreign  investors'  decisions,  the
paper also  employs  another  index of IPR  protection  developed  specifically  for this study.  This  simple
index  captures  both  the  legislative  and  the  enforcement  aspect  of the  IPR regime.  It  is  based  on the
descriptions  of  IPR  regimes  provided  by  the  International  Intellectual  Property  Alliance  in  their
recommendations  for  countries  to be  placed  on  the  U.S.  Special  301  Watch  List.  These  descriptions
include the issue of enforcement  and pay special attention to trademark and copyright laws. Note that the
actual  placements on the Special  301  Watch  List have not been used in developing  the index, since they
depend not only on the extent of IPR violations  in a specific country but also on the  importance  of the
country  to  the  U.S.  interests.  Again  1995  is used  as  a reference  point  in the rating.  The table  below
presents  the rating  criteria.  A higher value of the  index corresponds  to stronger  IPR protection,  thus a
positive  coefficient  on  this variable  is expected.  Table  I lists  the  values  of the  index.  The correlation
between the Ginarte-Park  measure and this index is .57.
Index of Intellectual Property Protection
Points  Description
3  Close to adequate IPR legislation present by the end of 1995;
Some enforcement efforts undertaken
2  Close to adequate IPR legislation present by the end of 1995;
No enforcement efforts undertaken
I  Lack of adequate  IPR legislation at the end of 1995
Source:  constructed by the author based on IIPA Special 301 Recommendations
Other  control variables
The IPR  regime  may be  correlated  with  other  host country  characteristics  such  as the  overall
progress in reform,  effectiveness of the legal system, corruption  level, privatization policies and openness
to trade. Therefore,  additional variables are included in the regression to control for these factors.
s The  sources used  to extend the index include  Garrison (various  years), Baxter (various years) and websites of the
State Intellectual Property Offices in Croatia and Latvia.
8Multinational  corporations  are  less  likely  to  invest  in  risky  and  unstable  countries,  and  the
perceived  riskiness  of Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  has  often  been  cited  as  a  factor
discouraging  foreign  capital  inflows.9 Lankes  and Venables  (1996)  find a negative  association  between
EBRD  transition  indicators  and  country  risk  as  perceived  by  the  interviewed  firms,  with  the  rank
correlation  coefficient  equal  to  -.89. The transition  indicators  rate the progress of a country's  reforms in
the  following  areas:  price  liberalization  and  competition,  trade  and  exchange  system,  large-scale
privatization, small-scale privatization,  enterprise restructuring,  and banking reform.  See EBRD (1994, p.
I 1) for a detailed description.  Thus,  in the empirical  analysis, the average of the EBRD indicators  is used
as a proxy  for risks associated  with undertaking FDI  in a given host country.  Since the higher  values of
the  transition  index  indicate  a  greater  progress  in  reform,  one  would  expect  to  observe  a  positive
coefficient on this variable.
Further, the effectiveness of the legal system  is controlled for using another indicator produced by
the EBRD (see  EBRD,  1995,  p.  103).  This indicator,  ranging  from  I to 4*,  assesses  the extent to  which
legal  rules affecting investment  are clear  and accessible  as well as adequately  supported  administratively
and judicially.  The  value  of one  is  assigned  to countries  where  legal  rules are  usually  very unclear  and
often  contradictory,  the availability  of independent  legal  advice  is limited,  and the administration  of the
law  is  substantially  deficient.  The  highest  value  (4*)  is  assigned  to  countries  with  clear  and  readily
ascertainable  laws,  sophisticated  legal  advice  available  and well  functioning courts.  Note the maximum
score achieved by the countries in the group is 4.
Moreover,  a  measure of the extent of corrupt practices  in the country  is added  to the model. The
measure  is  the  1999  Transparency  International  Corruption  Perception  Index  which  pools  information
from ten  different surveys of business executives,  risk analysts and the general  public. The original  index
ranges between  10 (highly  clean) and  0 (highly corrupt). To facilitate  interpretation of the results, we re-
scaled the index in the following  way:  re-scaled TI  index = 10 - original TI index.  Thus,  a higher index
value corresponds  to a higher level of corruption and a negative coefficient is expected.'"
Since  privatization  policies may influence  the inflows of FDI, the model  also contains the share
of GDP accounted for by the private sector.  The figures pertain to  1995 and come from the EBRD (1995).
Additionally,  a  measure  of openness  to trade  (the  sum exports  and  imports as a  percentage  of GDP)  is
9  See, for example,  Zloch-Christy (1995),  World Bank (1996), Estrin et al. (1997),  and Hunya (1997).
10  While  the mismatch  in timing between  the index and the dataset is regrettable,  it is not possible to use the ratings
from earlier years since they cover very few transition economies.  Employing  an alternative  measure  of corruption
based  on  1994  interviews  with German  exporters  (see Ades and Di Tella,  1997,  for a description)  leads to similar
results (not reported in  the paper).
9included  in the  model  to  control  for tariff jumping  FDI.  The  data  refer  to  1993  and  come  from  the
EBRD."
The existing literature  finds the host country's market size to be an important determinant of FDI
inflows  (see  Dunning,  1993;  Caves,  1996;  Braunerjelm  and Svensson,  1996). Most  studies show  that a
large market size encourages FDI inflows. Therefore, the model includes GDP per capita which is a proxy
for the purchasing  power of local consumers and the population  size which reflects  the potential  size of
the  market.  Both  variables  come  from  EBRD  (1994)  and  refer  to  1993.  They  are  entered  in  the
logarithmic form.  Finally, we control for the corporate  tax rate as higher taxation  is likely to discourage
investment.  The figures  (expressed  as percentages)  come  from PriceWaterhousePaineWebber.  If several
rates apply, the highest one was used.'2
As  explained  above,  it  is  necessary  to  include  firm  specific  variables  when  testing the  second
hypothesis.  Thus, standard  variables found  in most FDI studies are included  in the model. These are firm
size  (measured  by  the  firmn's  sales  in  US  dollars,  entered  as  logarithm),  R&D  intensity  (measured  by
R&D  outlays  as  a  percentage  of  net  sales),  advertising  intensity  (proxied  by  selling,  general  &
administrative  expenses  as  a  percentage  of net  sales;'3 and  a proxy  for production  diversification  (the
number of four-digit SIC codes describing a firm's activities).  All information  on firm characteristics was
obtained from the  Worldscope database and pertains to fiscal year  1993 (from 4/93 to 3/94). Additionally,
we control for investor's regional experience,  proxied by a dummy variable  indicating whether  a firm had
a trading relationship with the region before  1989.  The last variable comes from the EBRD survey.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Impact of  IPR  protection on probability of FDI  taking  place
The empirical  analysis confirms the first hypothesis of the study. The estimation results with the
Ginarte-Park  index  are presented  in  Table  2.'4  In  five  out of six  regressions,  the extent of intellectual
property protection affects the probability of investment in those high technology sectors that rely heavily
on  IPRs  but not  in  other  industries.  The coefficients  for  the  IPR  sensitive  sectors  bear,  as  expected,
" The  openness  measure  could  potentially  be  endogenous  as FDI  contributes  to  increased  trade  flows.  Given,
however,  that we focus on the beginning of the transition  process when the volume of FDI inflows was limited, the
endogeneity problem is unlikely to affect our results.
12  Because of data constraints,  we  use statutory tax rates even though effective tax rates might be more appropriate.
However,  Wei's (1999)  findings indicate that substituting  the former tax rates with the latter has a negligible effect
on the results.
13 Note that this is a standard proxy in the literature and has been used, for instance, by Grubaugh  (1987).
14 Note that the number of observation  is equal  to the number  of firms  in the sample  times the number of possible
destination countries. Because  of firm specific dummy variables, firms with no investment in the region drop out of
the estimation.  The sample is  further reduced by the fact that the Ginarte-Park index covers only  19 countries.
10positive  signs and  are significant  at  least at the five  percent level.  In the last regression both  coefficients
on the Ginarte-Park  index are significant.
The  other variables  also  have  the  anticipated  signs.  Population  size  is  found  to have  a positive
impact on FDI inflows  in all  industries.  IPR sensitive  sectors do not appear to be affected  differently  by
this  variable.  GDP  per  capita  is  positively  related  to  FDI  inflows  and  in  majority  of cases,  it  does  not
affect the  high technology sectors differently.  As expected,  progress  in transition,  greater effectiveness  of
the  legal  regulations  governing  investment  and  more  advanced  privatization  process  increase  the
probability  of FDI  in  all sectors.  Higher  level of corruption  and  higher corporate  tax rates,  on the  other
hand,  deters  foreign  investors.  The coefficients  on  the  interactions  of these variables  with  a dummy  for
IPR  sensitive  sectors  are  not significant.  The openness  measure  has a significant  impact only on  the IPR
sensitive  sectors.  A possible explanation  is that  firms  in these  sectors  may be  more reliant on  imports as
they tend to transfer  only  part of (rather  than whole)  production  process to the region  for fear of losing
their intangible assets.
Table  3 presents  the  estimation  results  with  the  second  IPR  measure.  Unlike  the  Ginarte-Park
index of patent rights  protection, this index captures both  the  legal and  the enforcement  aspect of an  IPR
regime.  It  is  also  broader  in  scope  as  it  pertains  to  IPRs  in  general  rather  than just patents.  As  in  the
previous  table,  we  find that  stronger  IPR protection  increases  the  probability  that  multinationals  in the
four sensitive  sectors  will  undertake  FDI.  In five  out of six cases,  the coefficients  are  significant  at  the
five or one percent  level. Additionally,  in four regressions,  the strength of the IPR regime affects not only
the sensitive  sectors but also all investors.  The signs and significance  levels of other control  variables are
similar to those found in Table 2.
The reason why all firms, not just those  in IPR sensitive sectors,  may be affected  by the extent of
intellectual  property  protection  is that an  IPR regime  may also play  a signaling  role.  As  Lall  (1997,  p.
244)  points  out,  "...  the  'signaling  value'  of  the  intellectual  property  regime  has  become  extremely
important  in  recent  years.  In  general,  countries  that  seek  to  attract  technology-intensive  foreign
investment  also offer strong  protection  to those  investments."  As  the  results  in Tables  2  and 3 suggest,
signaling takes place only if the legislative  changes are  accompanied  by enforcement efforts.
To  further  test the  robustness  of the  findings,  the  following  exercise  was  performed.  An OLS
regression  was  estimated  with  the  dependent  variables  equal  to the  share of firms  in the  four sensitive
sectors that  undertook  FDI  in  each of the  countries  in the  sample.'5 The  same  explanatory  variables  as
those  in Tables 2 and 3 were included.  The results are presented  in Appendix Table  IA. They suggest that
'  In other words,  the  dependent  variable  is equal to  the number  of firms  in IPR sensitive  sectors  that  invested  in
country c divided by the total number of firms in these sectors in the sample.the earlier  findings are quite  robust.  In ten  out of twelve  regressions,  the IPR measure  is significant and
bears the expected  sign. All regressions  have a high explanatory power.
In summary, the empirical analysis indicates that the strength of patent laws as well as the overall
level of IPR protection  (both  laws on the books and their enforcement) affect FDI inflows  in several high
technology  sectors  where,  as  surveys  show,  IPRs  play  an  important  role.  Moreover,  there  is  some
evidence  that  the  overall  strength  of the  IPR  regime  and  its  enforcement  influences  the  investment
decision of multinationals active  in other sectors as well.
Impact of  IPR protection on the choice ofprojectfunction
Table  4  presents  the  empirical  results  from  the  test  of the  second  hypothesis.  As  mentioned
above,  the  hypothesis  was tested  by  looking jointly  at two decisions:  (1) whether  or  not FDI  is taking
place and (2)  conditional  on  an FDI project  being  undertaken,  whether  it involves  setting  up production
facilities  or focuses solely  on building distribution networks.  The results of the investment  decision with
respect  to  host  country  characteristics  are  consistent  with  those  found  in  the  earlier  section.  One
interesting change  is  that the  new model  suggests that  firms  in  IPR sensitive  sectors  are  more strongly
deterred  by  corruption  in  a host  country  than  firms  in  other  industries.  This may  be  associated  with
investor's  fear  that  in  the  case  of legal  disputes  on,  for  instance,  patent  infringement  higher  level  of
corruption  will  lower the chances that the dispute will be adjudicated  fairly." 6 The coefficients  on firm
characteristics  also have the expected  signs. Namely,  the data suggest that that larger firms and those  with
greater  intangible  assets,  regional  experience  and  more  diversified  production  are  more  likely  to
undertake  investment in the region.
The  hypothesis  of interest  is  supported  by the data.  As  Table  4  indicates,  foreign  investors  are
more  likely  to  engage  in  local  production,  as  opposed  to  focusing  solely  on  setting  up  distribution
networks,  in  countries  with  stronger  IPR  regimes.  The  relevant  coefficient  (Ginarte-Park  index)  is
statistically significant  in  all regressions.  Interestingly, this effect  is significant for all sectors and does not
appear  to  be  stronger  in  the  case of IPR  sensitive  industries."  These  findings are  consistent  with  the
survey evidence  provided by Mansfield (1994) and the Zeneca case study cited above.
The  data also  indicate  that manufacturing  FDI  is more  likely to take  place in  countries with  a
larger population  size, which may be explained by the economies  of scale enjoyed  in large markets.  GDP
per  capita  appears  to  be  negatively  correlated  with  the  probability  of  local  production.  A  possible
16 See  Smarzynska and Wei (2000)  for a discussion on the impact of corruption on the composition of FDI inflows.
17  A  possible  explanation  is that investors  in IPR sensitive  sectors  may not be  interested in setting  up distribution
networks  unless they expect  the  host country  environment  to  be conducive  to undertaking  local  production  in the
future.
12explanation  is that countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have higher labor costs which make local
production  less  attractive.  The  probability  of manufacturing  FDI  is positively  affected  by the transition
progress.  Since setting up a production plant is more costly than setting up a distribution  network alone, it
is not surprising  the foreign  investors choose the former option  in countries that appear to be more stable
due  to  an  advanced  reform  process.  Manufacturing  projects  are  also  more  likely  to  take  place  in
economies  where  the  privatization  process  is  more  advanced  as  it  brings  opportunities  for  acquiring
domestic  production  facilities.  Corporate  taxation  and  openness  to  trade  do  not  appear  to  have  a
statistically  significant impact.
Turning  to  investor  characteristics,  the  findings  indicate  that  firms  possessing  more  intangible
assets, as measured by R&D and advertising intensity,  are less likely to undertake manufacturing  projects.
This  may be due to the  fact that the potential  for  knowledge  dissipation  is  greater when  the production
takes place in a host country than when the final products are  imported.  Firm size appears to be, albeit not
very  robustly,  positively  correlated  with  the probability  of a  manufacturing  project.  To the  extent  that
larger firms  have more  resources  for investment,  this finding would indicate  that the choice  between the
two types of activities is  affected by financial  constraints.  Finally, we find that manufacturing  projects are
more likely to be undertaken  by firms without previous regional experience."8
Table  5 presents the results  obtained using  the other IPR index.  While  in this case,  the  support
for the hypothesis  is much weaker, other results are broadly comparable with those  in Table 4.
As an additional  robustness check, we estimated a multinomial  logit model with the left  hand side
variable reflecting  three options  available  to a potential  investor:  (i)  no  investment  at all;  (ii) investment
solely  in  distribution  networks;  and  (iii)  investment  in  production  facilities  possibly  accompanied  by
distribution networks.  Appendix Table  2A presents the results.  Since the choice  between  manufacturing
and non-manufacturing  project  is of interest to us, the results are  presented relative  to option  (ii), that is,
investment  in distribution networks.  As the first part of the table indicates,  in seven out of eight cases, the
coefficient on  IPR protection  is positive  and statistically significant,  indicating that stronger IPR regimes
increase the likelihood of FDI in production  facilities relative to distribution only projects.  IPR protection,
hiowever,  does not appear  to have  a statistically  significant  impact  on the  choice between  investment  in
distribution networks and no investment at all.
Summing  up,  the  empirical  results  indicate  that  weaker  protection  of  intellectual  property
discourages  foreign  investors  from  undertaking  local  production  and  tilts  their  preferences  towards
18 While one would expect that less experienced  firms shy away from manufacturing projects,  it is possible that their
investments take place through joint ventures and thus previous  regional experience  matters less as they  can benefit
from the knowledge of local partners  (see  Smarzynska 2000).
13projects  focusing on distribution  alone.  This is  the case  for all  investors,  not just those  in IPR  sensitive
sectors.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Governments  all  over the world compete  fiercely to attract foreign  direct investment hoping that
multinational  corporations  will bring new technologies,  management  skills and  marketing  know-how.  In
order to create an investment friendly environment,  it is important to understand the  factors that influence
FDI inflows as well as the determinants of the composition of such flows. This study sheds some light  on
this issue by examining the impact of IPR protection on the structure of FDI inflows.
Unlike  the  earlier  literature,  which  focused on  aggregate  FDI flows,  we  employ a  unique  firm-
level  data  set describing  investment  projects  in Eastern  Europe  and the forner Soviet Union.  Since this
region  was  virtually  closed  to  FDI  before  1989,  its  sudden  opening  to  foreign  investment  can  be
compared to a natural  experiment.  Therefore, the data set used  in this study presents a unique opportunity
to estimate the effect of IPR protection  on FDI  in the absence  of investment history.  It is possible that  in
earlier  studies,  the  lack of controls  for past  policy  variables  and  investment  history  has  obscured  the
impact of IPR protection on FDI.
Both hypotheses  tested in the study find  empirical  support.  First, the  data  indicate that investors
in sectors  relying  heavily on protection  of intellectual  property are deterred  by  a weak  IPR regime  in  a
potential  host  country.  There  is  also  some  evidence  that  weak  IPR  protection  may  discourage  all
investors,  not just those in the sensitive  sectors. Second, the  lack of IPR protection  deters investors from
undertaking  local  production  and  encourages  them  to  focus  on  distribution  of  imported  products.
Interestingly,  this effect is present  in all sectors, not only those relying heavily on IPR protection.
The results of this study suggest that more research  is needed to improve our understanding  of  the
implications  of IPR  regimes  for the  magnitude  and  composition  of FDI  inflows  and  their  impact  on
developing  countries.  More  specifically,  it  would  be  useful  to  study  the  characteristics  of  actual
technologies  transferred  by multinationals  to their subsidiaries  to  learn  whether  it  is the case that newer
technologies are  more  likely to be  transferred  to host countries  with stronger  IPR protection  while only
older technologies are used in subsidiaries  located in economies with weak intellectual  property regimes.
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16Table 1. Measures of IPR protection
IPR Index based  on Ginarte-Park Patent  IIPA Special  301
Rights Index  recommendations
Armenia  I
Azerbaijan  I
Belarus*  3.19  1
Bulgaria  2.57  2
Croatia*  3.71
Czech  Republic  3.19  3
Estonia*  2.86  2
FYR Macedonia*  2.52
Georgia*  3.00  1
Hungary  3.75  3
Kazakhstan*  3.19  1
Kyrgyzstan  I
Latvia*  2.88  2
Lithuania  2.57
Moldova*  3.00  2
Poland  3.23  3
Romania  2.71  1
Russia  3.04  2




Ukraine  3.04  2
Uzbekistan*  2.52  1
Average  3.04  1.71
* denotes  index values calculated  by the author
17Table 2. Probit results with Ginarte-Park index of patent rights protection
Ginarte-Park index  0.30  0.25  -0.15  -0.25  0.32  0.37*
(0.40)  (0.34)  (0.41)  (0.25)  (0.21)  (0.23)
IPR sensitive * Ginarte-Park  index  0.40**  0.42***  0.43**  0.55***  0.56***  0.31*
(0.18)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.18)
GDP per capita  0.00  -0.06  0.55***  0.44***  0.23***  0.15
(0.17)  (0.14)  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.09)
IPR sensitive * GDP per capita  0.12  0.10  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.35***
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.13)
Population  0.52***  0.56***  0.58***  0.61***  0.43***  0.40***
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)
IPR sensitive * Population  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.12**
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)
Progress in reform  i.08***  1.21***
(0.17)  (0.15)
IPR sensitive * Progress in reform  -0.15  -0.10
(0. 19)  (0.19)
Corporate tax rate  -0.02*
(0.01)
IPR sensitive * Corporate tax rate  -0.01
(0.01)
Legal effectiveness  0.29*
(0.15)




IPR sensitive * Corruption  -0.02
(0.05)
Privatization  0.04***  0.04***
(0.00)  (0.00)
IPR sensitive * Privatization  0.00  0.00
(0 01)  (0.00)
Openness  -0.17
(0.11)
IPR sensitive * Openness  0.71***
(0.16)
No. obs.  6,707  6,707  6,707  6,354  6,707  6,707
Chi2 47.8  89.78  54.1  50.9  141.5  120.0
Prob > Chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo R2  0.36  0.36  0.34  0.34  0.38  0.39
Log Likelihood  -1,820  -1,801  -1,890  -1,828  -1,752  -1,746
t**  denotes  significant at 1%  level,  a  at 5%,  * at  10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Firm dummies have been included in all regressions.  'IPR sensitive'  denotes a dummy  variable for IPR sensitive  sectors.
18Table 3.  Probit results with IPR index
IPR  index  0.25**  0.27***  0.16  0.24**  0.12  0.13*
(0.10)  (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.07)
IPR sensitive  * IPR index  0.29***  0.33***  0.33***  0.25**  0.30***  0.03
(0.10)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.12)
GDP per capita  0.34***  0.28***  0.60***  0.46***  0.46***  0.43***
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.09)
IPR sensitive * GDP per capita  0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.01  0.48**
(0.11)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.22)
Population  0.43***  0.45***  0.47***  0.48***  0.40***  0.40***
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04)
IPR sensitive  * Population  0.03  0.04  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.15***
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.06)
Progress  in reform  0.60***  0.66***
(0.12)  (0.14)
IPR sensitive * Progress  in reform  -0.14  -0.14
(0.13)  (0.14)
Corporate tax rate  -0.02***
(0.01)
[PR sensitive * Corporate tax rate  -0.02***
(0.01)
Legal effectiveness  0.27**
(0.12)




IPR sensitive * Corruption  -0.06
(0.10)
Privatization  0.03***  0.03***
(0.00)  (0.00)




[PR sensitive  * Openness  0.80***
(0.24)
No. obs.  7,329  6,631  7,329  6,631  7,329  7,329
Chi2 77.01  52.67  64.93  78.02  56.74  9800
Prob > Chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Pseudo R2 0.43  0.42  0.42  0.42  0.44  0.44
Log Likelihood  -1629.9  -1595.5  -1650.2  -1603.4  -1612.2  -1606.7
** denotes  significant at  1% level, ** at 5%,  * at 10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Firm dummies have been included in all regressions.  'IPR sensitive'  denotes a dummy variable for IPR sensitive sectors.
19Table 4. Bivariate probit with sample selection.  Manufacturing vs. distribution projects.  Ginarte-Park index.
INVESTMENT  DECISION
Ginarte-Park index  -0.26  -0.29  -0.29  0.21  0.08
(0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.24)  (0.12)
IPR sensitive * Ginarte-Park  index  0.22*  0.33*  0.33*  -0.08  0.04
(0.13)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.  9)
GDP per capita  0.28***  0.29***  0.29***  -0.04  0.02
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.05)
IPR sensitive * GDP per capita  -0.01  -0.07  -0.07  0.05  0.16**
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.08)
Population  0.34***  0.35***  0.34***  0.37***  0.31***
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.03)
IPR sensitive * Population  0.11  0.11  0.11  -0.04  0.08
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.04)  (0.06)
Corruption  -0.18**  -0.17**  -0.17*  -0.08**
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.04)
IPR sensitive * Corruption  -0.12***  -0.17***  -0.17***  -0.12
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04)
Corporate tax  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
[PR sensitive  * Corporate  tax  0.02  0.01  0.00
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)
Progress  in reform  0.67***
(0.11)








IPR sensitive  * Openness  0.02
(0.12)
Firm size  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
R&D intensity  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Advertising intensity  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Production diversification  0.04**  0.04**  0.04**  0.04**  0.04**
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Regional experience  0.95***  0.95***  0.95***  0.97***  0.98***
(0.04)  ((0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Constant  -5.37***  -5.32***  -5.33***  -7.65***  -6.74
(0.71)  (0.69)  (0.75)  (0-61)  (0.50
The table continues on  the following  page.
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Ginarte-Park  index  0.28*  0.29*  0.31**  0.38**  0.57***
(0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.14)
IPR sensitive  * Ginarte-Park
index  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.01  -0.04
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)
GDP per capita  -0.26**  -0.25  -0.26  -0.16  -0.22*
(0.12)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.13)
Population  -0.06  -0.04  -0.05  0.37***  0.19***
(0.12)  (0.17)  (0.21)  (0.03)  (0.03)
Corporate tax rate  0.00
(0.01)






Firm size  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  0.16***  0.08***
(0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.02)
R&D intensity  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.04***  -0.09***
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)
Advertising  intensity  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.00  -0.03***
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Production diversification  -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.06***  0.01  -0.05*
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)
Regional experience  -0.90***  -0.88***  -0.88***  0.60***  -0.36**
(0.11)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.17)
Constant  4.93*  4.57  4.69  -7.19***  -1.72
(2.59)  (3.73)  (4.09)  (0.63)  (2.01)
Rho  -0.84  -0.80  -0.82  0.98  0.01
Chi2 (Wald  Test of Rho = 0)  2.05  1.07  0.72  5.93  0.00
Prob > Chi2 0.15  0.30  0.40  0.01  0.95
No. of obs.  5459  5459  5459  5764  5459
No. of obs.  (1st equation)  4959  4959  4959  5260  4959
No. of obs. (2nd equation)  500  500  500  504  500
denotes  significant at  1%  level,  ** at 5%,  * at 10%.  Standard errors are  in parentheses.
2 1Table 5. Bivariate probit with sample selection.  Manufacturing  vs. distribution projects.  IPR index.
INVESTMENT DECISION
IPR index  0.12*  0.13  0.13**  0.10  -0.06
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.07)
IPR sensitive * IPR index  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.14*  0.08
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.08)
GDP per capita  0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.28***  0.35***
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.08)
IPR sensitive * GDP per capita  0.04  0.04  0.04.  -0.03  0.12***
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)
Population  0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.29***  0.30***
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)
IPR sensitive * Population  0.13***  0.14***  0.14***  -0.01  0.14
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)
Corruption  -0.11***  -0.10**  -0.11**  -0.06**
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)
IPR sensitive * Corruption  -0.11***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -015*
(0.02)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)
Corporate tax  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.0 1)
IPR sensitive * Corporate tax  0.01  0.01  0.00
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)
Progress in reform  0.29*
(0.16)








IPR sensitive  * Openness  0.08
(0.06)
Firmn  size  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.18***  0.17**
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
R&D intensity  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03**
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Advertising intensity  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01**
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Production diversification  0.04***  0.04**  0.04***  0.04**  0.04*
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Regional experience  0.95***  0.95***  0.95***  0.97***  0.96**
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Constant  -6.84***  -6.80***  -6.80***  -8.29***  -8.41  **
(0.36)  (0.44)  (0.48)  (0.54)  (0.72)
The table continues on the following page.
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IPR index  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  0.19**  0.11**
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.05)
IPR sensitive  * IPR index  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)
GDP per capita  -0.42***  -0.41***  -0.41***  0.01  -0.48***
(0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.09)
Population  0.13***  0.13***  0.13***  0.32***  0.16***
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)
Corporate tax rate  -0.00
(0.00)






Firm size  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  0.17***  -0.12***
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
R&D intensity  -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.05***  -0.06***
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Advertising intensity  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.01  -0.02***
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.0027)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Production  diversification  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***  0.01  -0.05***
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Regional experience  -0.95***  -0.94***  -0.94***  0.53***  -0.93***
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.05)
Constant  7.98***  7.94***  7.94***  -6.62***  8.73***
(0.48)  (0.39)  (0.37)  (0.79)  (0.81)
Rho  -1.00  -1.00  -1.00  0.95  -0.98
Chi2 (WaldTestofRho=0)  3.91  0.22  0.11  14.39  13.48
Prob > Chi2 0.05  0.64  0.74  0.00  0.0
No. of obs.  5766  5766  5766  5766  576
No. of obs. (1st equation)  5292  5292  5292  5292  5292
No. of obs. (2nd equation)  474  474  474  474  47
***  denotes significant  at 1% level,  ** at 5%, * at  10%.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 1A. Results of OLS regressions
Ginarte-Park  index  0.07*  0.08**  0.03  0.04  0.07**  0.07**
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)
IPR index  0.05***  0.04***  0.04**  0.05***  0.04**  0.04**
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
GDP per capita  -0.01  -0.02  0.04*  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Population  0.04***  0.05***  0.04***  0.05***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.04***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Progress in reform  0.08**  0.10***  0.03**  0.05**
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)
Corporate tax rate  -0.004**  -0.004**
(0.00)  (0.00)
Legal effectiveness  0.01  0.01
(0.02)  (0.01)
Corruption  -0.03**  -0.02
(0.01)  (0.01)
Privatization  0.003***  0.003***  0.001**  0.001*
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Openness  0.00  0.00
(0.02)  (0.02)
Constant  -0.39***  -0.29***  -0.40***  -0.06  -0.41***  -0.42***  -0.20***  -0.10  -0.22***  0.00  -0.20***  -0.19***
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.09)
No. obs.  19  19  19  18  19  19  21  19  21  19  21  21
F-statistic  12.86  18.11  7.31  9.85  19.87  14.81  22.05  26.27  16.46  16.49  21.87  16.42
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
R'  0.79  0.87  0.68  0.75  0.85  0.85  0.85  0.91  0.80  0.81  0.85  0.85
Adjusted R 2 0.72  0.83  0.58  0.68  0.81  0.79  0.81  0.88  0.76  0.77  0.81  0.79
***  denotes significant at 1% level,  ** at 5%,  * at 10%. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.Table 2A. Multinomial logit results. Manufacturing vs.  distribution projects vs.  no FDI.
FDI IN MANUFACTURING  FACILITIES RELATIVE  TO FDI IN DISTRIBUTION  NETWORKS
Ginarte-Park  index  0.83***  0.84***  0.63**  0.97***
(0.30)  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.20)
IPR index  0.40**  0.22  0.31**  0.44***
(0.18)  (0.22)  (0.14)  (0.16)
GDP per capita  -0.64***  -0.73***  -0.74***  -0.57***  -0.41*  -0.60**  -0.79***  -0.62***
(0.24)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.22)  (0.24)
Population  0.32***  0.41***  0.41***  0.19***  0.27***  0.40***  0.40***  0.17**
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)
Progress in  reform  0.96***  0.83***  0.99***  0.30  0.54**  0.94***
(0.26)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.24)
Corruption  -0.21**  -0.15*  -0.21  -0.03
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.16)  (0.14)
Corporate  tax  -0.02*  -0.04***
(0.01)  (0.01)
Privatization  0.04***  0.02*
(0.01)  (0.01)
Openness  -0.27  -0.50*
(0.17)  (0.20)
Firm size  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)
R&D intensity  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.13***  -0.15***  -0.14***  -0.14***  -0.15***
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Advertising  intensity  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Production diversification  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Regional experience  -0.69***  -0.70***  -0.70***  -0.68***  -0.68***  -0.70***  -0.69***  -0.69***
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)
Constant  -0.57  1.81  2.30*  -0.33  1.48  3.83  3.66*  3.42**
.______________________  (1.27)  (1.84)  (1.39)  (1.44)  (1.27)  (2.33)  (2.02)  (1.69)
The table continues  on the following  page.NO FDI RELATIVE TO FDI IN DISTRIBUTION  NETWORKS
Ginarte-Park index  -0.08  0.14  0.18  0.01
(0.40)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.28)
IPR index  -0.07  -0.10  -0.09  0.31**
(0.22)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.13)
GDP per capita  -0.22  -0.15  -0.15  -0.49***  -0.65***  -0.64***  -0.66***  -1.14***
(0.17)  (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.20)
Population  -0.53***  -0.58***  -0.58***  -0.50***  -0.46***  .0.48***  -0.48***  -0.56***
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)
Progress  in reform  -0.80***  -0.65***  -0.70***  -0.52*  -0.10  -0.03
(0.19)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.29)  (0.26).  (0.31)
Corruption  0.25**  0.22**  0.24**  0.28**
(0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.13)
Corporate tax  0.01  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.01)
Privatization  -0.03***  -0.03***
(0.01)  (0.01)
Openness  -0.37**  -0.88
(0.16)  (0.21)
Firm size  -0.35***  -0.35***  -0.35***  -0.35***  -0.37***  -0.37***  -0.37***  -0.37***
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
R&D intensity  -0.08***  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Advertising intensity  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.04***
(0-00)  (0-00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Production  diversification  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.09**  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.09o
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Regional experience  -2.25***  -2.26***  -2.27***  -2.26***  -2.25***  -2.25***  -2.25***  -2.25***
(0.10)  (0.1I1)  (0.1I1)  (0.1I1)  (0. 11)  (0.1I1)  (0.1I1)  (0.I1)
Constant  15.80***  12.55***  12.58***  17.29***  18.11***  15.10***  14.97***  21.91***
(0.97)  (1.38)  (1.42)  (0.78)  (1.30)  (1.10)  (1.05)  (t.69)
No. of obs.  5795  5490  5490  5795  6405  5795  5795  6405
PseudoRZ_  0.26  0.27  0.27  0.27  0.30  0.29  0.29  0.31
***  denotes significant  at 1%  level, ** at 5%, * at  10%. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Errors have been corrected for a correlation between observations  for the same destination  country,Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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